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Ms. Patricia Bartholomew
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
450 South State Street, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re: State v. Cornell, 20030667-SC
Dear Ms. Bartholomew:
The State respectfully submits this letter pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The State considers that the following two cases relevant to the Court's disposition
of this case: State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276 (finding no plain error in trial court's
omission of the word, "speedy" from plea colloquy under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure), and State v. Manning, 2004 UT App 87, f t 25, 29-30 n.10, 89 P.3d 196 (finding that
trial court's statement to defendant that the defendant's right to appeal was "very limited"
sufficient to satisfy rule 11(e)(8) requirement).
Respectfully

Kenneth A. Bronston
Assistant Attorney General

cc: Kent R. Hart
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governing pleas is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11.

H
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
Wallace Wayne DEAN, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 20020952.

131 Criminal Law €==>273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
The purpose of the rule governing pleas is to ensure that
defendants know their rights and understand the basic
consequences of their decision to plead guilty. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rule 11.

July 27, 2004.
I £ Criminal Law €=^273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Background: Defendant was convicted on his plea of
guilty in the District Court, Cedar City Department,
Robert T. Braithwaite, J., of assault and felony and
misdemeanor child abuse. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 57 P.3d 1106, reversed. State
petitioned for writ of certiorari.
Holding: The Supreme Court, Durham, C.J., held that
no obvious error resulted from trial court's statement to
defendant during plea colloquy that he had right to a
"trial by jury" rather than "a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury," as set forth in rule governing pleas.

Plea affidavits or plea statements are properly used and
incorporated into the record when the trial court
determines that the defendant has read the affidavit or
statement, understands its contents, and acknowledges
those contents; proper incorporation of plea affidavits
can save the court time, eliminate some of the
monotony of rote recitation, and allow a more focused
inquiry into the facts of the offense and whether the
plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered.
151 Criminal Law €==>274(2)
110k274(2) Most Cited Cases

Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed.

West Headnotes

Withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right,
that is left to the trial court's sound discretion.
U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6(2)(a).

HI Criminal Law €=>1134(7)
110k! 134(7) Most Cited Cases

161 Criminal Law €=^1149
110k! 149 Most Cited Cases

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of
Appeals' decision for correctness; the correctness of the
Court of Appeals' decision turns on whether that court
correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review.

Appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's
determination that a defendant has failed to show good
cause for withdrawal of his guilty plea unless it is clear
that the trial court has abused its discretion.
U.C.A.1953. 77-13-6(2)(a).

12] Criminal Law €=>1134(3)
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases

HI Criminal Law €=>1134(2)
110k! 134(2) Most Cited Cases

Whether the trial co urt strictly complied with rule

When reviewing the trial court's denial of defendant's

Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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motion to withdraw guilty plea, reviewing court may
consider record of plea proceedings, including plea
colloquy and plea affidavit or statement; thus, review of
denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea is not limited
to denial of motion itself.

1131 Criminal Law €=>1043(2)
110k 1043 (2) Most Cited Cases

M Criminal Law € ^ 1 1 3 4 ( 2 )
110k! 134(2) Most Cited Cases

[131 Criminal Law €=>1130(5)
110k 1130(5) Most Cited Cases

Appellate review of the trial court's denial of a
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea may
consider the facts and circumstances in which the plea
was taken.

Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review issue
of whether trial court's alleged failure to comply with
rule governing pleas required grant of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea; defendant did not sufficiently
bring issue to trial court's attention in his motion to
withdraw, nor was it supported by evidence or relevant
legal authority, but, instead, defendant vaguely asserted
that there were "two significant departures" from due
process and equal protection.

121 Criminal Law €^>1030(2)
110k 103 0(2) Most Cited Cases
In general, appellate courts will not consider an issue,
including constitutional arguments, raised for the first
time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain
error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.
1101 Criminal Law €=^1030(1)
110kl030q) Most Cited Cases
A proper objection puts the judge on notice of the
asserted error and allows the opportunity for correction
at that time in the course of the proceeding.
fill Criminal Law €=>1030(1)
110kl030q) Most Cited Cases

1131 Criminal Law €=^1030(4)
110k 103 0(4) Most Cited Cases

[141 Criminal Law €==>1030(1)
110kl03Q(l) Most Cited Cases
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish
that (1) an error exists, (2) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful,
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for the appellant; if any one
of these requirements is not met, plain error is not
established.
[151 Criminal Law <€>==>273.1(4)

110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
[111 Criminal Law €^>1130(5)
1 lQkl 130(5) Most Cited Cases
An issue must be sufficiently raised to a level of
consciousness before the trial court and must be
supported by evidence or relevant legal authority in
order for it to be considered on appeal.
[121 Criminal Law €^>1030(1)
110kl030(l) Most Cited Cases
Failure to raise and argue an issue and present pertinent
evidence in the trial court denies the trial court the
opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions
of law concerning the claimed error.

No obvious error resulted from trial court's statement to
defendant during plea colloquy that he had right to a
"trial by jury" rather than "a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury," as set forth in rule governing pleas,
given that law in this area was not sufficiently clear or
plainly settled such as to have adequately guided trial
court at time defendant's plea of guilty to child abuse
and assault was entered. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11.
[161 Criminal Law €=>1030(1)
110k 103 0(1) Most Cited Cases
To establish that error should have been obvious to the
trial court, defendant must show that the law governing
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the error was clear at the time the alleged error was
made.
[171 Criminal Law €^>1030(1)
110k 103Ofl) Most Cited Cases

J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for respondent.

*278 AMENDED OPINION
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Under the plain error doctrine, defendant must not only
demonstrate that the error was obvious, but also that it
was harmful or of such a magnitude that there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the defendant; this harmfulness test is equivalent to the
prejudice test applied in assessing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
[181 Criminal Law €=^641.13(5)
110k641.13(5) Most Cited Cases
Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial; thus, counsel's deficient performance
must have affected the outcome of the plea process.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

DURHAM, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
1f 1 Wallace Wayne Dean pled guilty to two counts of
child abuse and one count of assault. Dean later sought
to withdraw his plea, claiming the trial judge had not
strictly complied with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e). The trial court denied Dean's motion. Dean
appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The case is
now before us on a writ of certiorari. We reverse.

BACKGROUND
K 2 On March 8, 2000, Dean pled guilty to two counts
of child abuse and one count of assault. fFNll These
charges stemmed from incidents of abuse and assault
involving Dean's two children and his now deceased
wife. In exchange for Dean's guilty plea, other pending
charges were dismissed.

[191 Criminal Law €^>641.13(5)
110k641.13(5) Most Cited Cases
Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel, establishing harm
generally requires the defendant's assertion that "but
for" the alleged error, he would not have pled guilty.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
[201 Criminal Law €^>1031(4)
110k 1031(4) Most Cited Cases
Defendant failed to allege that trial court's statement to
defendant during plea colloquy that he had right to a
"trial by jury" rather than "a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury," as set forth in rule governing pleas,
prejudiced him in any way, as necessary for him to
establish plain error, in prosecution for child abuse and
assault. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 11.
*277 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeanne B. Inouye,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, David E.Doxev, Cedar
City, for petitioner.

FN1. See State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323,
57P.3d 1106, for a more detailed description
of the facts.

\ 3 In connection with his plea, Dean executed a plea
statement detailing the constitutional rights he was
waiving. The plea statement declared, in relevant part,
as follows:
I, Wallace Wayne Dean ... under oath, hereby
acknowledge that I have entered a plea of "guilty" to
the offense(s) of Child Abuse (Count I), ... Child
Abuse (Count III), ... and Assault (Count V).... I
farther understand the charge[s] to which this plea of
"guilty" is entered ... and that I am entering such a
plea voluntarily and of my own free will, after
conferring with my Attorney... and with a knowledge
and understanding of the following facts:
I know that I have constitutional rights under the
Constitutions of Utah and the United States to plead
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not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge [s]
to which I have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial
by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I
know I have a right to be represented by counsel and
that I am in fact represented by ... my attorney.
I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the
charge[s], I have a right to confront the witnesses
against me.... I also know that I have the right to have
witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to
testify in Court on my behalf and that I could, if I
elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf,
and that if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will
be told that this may not be held against me if I
choose to have the jury so instructed.
I know that if I were to have a trial that the State must
prove each and every element of the crime [s] charged
to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a
reasonable doubt; ... and that any verdict by a jury...
must be by a unanimous agreement of all jurors.
I know that ... I have a right against
self-incrimination.
I know that if I wish to contest the charge[s] against
me, I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will
be set for trial.... I know and understand that by
entering a plea of "guilty," I am waiving my
constitutional rights ... and that I am, in fact, fully
incriminating myself by admitting I am guilty of the
crime[s] to which my plea of "guilty" is entered.

Page 4

second-degree misdemeanor?
*279Mr. Dean: Guilty plea.
The Court:
Count V, assault, a Class B
misdemeanor?
Mr. Dean: Guilty.
U 5 Approximately one month later, on April 10,2000,
Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating
that the plea was not taken pursuant to rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Dean did not
specify the basis for the violation. Instead, he merely
alleged that there were "two significant departures"
from due process and equal protection, without further
explanation.
K 6 The next day, the court denied Dean's motion to
withdraw and imposed sentence, concluding that Dean
had failed to show good cause for withdrawal of his
guilty plea. Dean appealed and argued for the first time
before the court of appeals that the trial court
committed plain error by not advising him of his right
to a "speedy public trial before an impartial jury."
(Emphasis added.) The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's denial of Dean's motion to withdraw and
vacated his conviction, concluding that failure to
include the words "speedy" and "impartial" as part of
the plea colloquy constituted plain error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

1f 4 Dean signed the plea statement and initialed each
paragraph. The following oral exchange took place
between Dean and the court at the time he signed the
statement:
The Court: All right. So are these your initials by
each of the 16 paragraphs?
Mr. Dean: Yes, sir.
The Court: Did you place them there after you first
read each and all paragraphs?
Mr. Dean: Yes, sir.
The Court: Are you in agreement with what your
attorney just said regarding what's written here,
handwriting?
Mr. Dean: Yes, sir.
The Court: Okay. What is your plea to Count I child
abuse, sex abuse?
Mr. Dean: Guilty plea.
The Court: Count III, child abuse, a Class A

ri1T2117 On certiorari, we review the court of appeals'
decision for correctness. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wall 1999 UT 33, IT 4, 978 P.2d 460. The correctness
of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that
court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under
the appropriate standard of review. Newspaper Agency
Corp. v. Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266,267 (Utah 1997).
Whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 is
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v.
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, % 10, 983 P.2d 556.
ANALYSIS
I. RULE 11
\ 8 Dean argues that he is entitled to withdraw his
guilty plea because the trial court failed to strictly
comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
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Procedure. The State counters that Dean's motion to
withdraw was properly denied by the trial court.
Moreover, the State argues that appellate review of a
trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw
is limited to the denial of the motion itself. Therefore,
the State asserts that we must limit our review to the
denial of Dean's motion to withdraw and should not
consider the record of the plea proceedings, the plea
colloquy, or the plea statement.
[3] If 9 Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 Ue) states,
in relevant part, that a court may not accept a guilty
plea until the court has found that "the defendant knows
of ... the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury." Utah R.Crim. P. 1 Ue). The purpose of
rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know their rights
and understand the basic consequences of their decision
to plead guilty. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^f 11, 22
P.3d 1242. However, we have also declared that this
purpose "should not be overshadowed or undermined
by formalistic ritual." Id. Moreover, while in State v.
Thurman, 911 P.2d 3 71,3 72 (Utah 1996), we described
the trial court's duty in this regard as a duty of "strict
compliance," we have also declared that strict
compliance " 'does not mandate a particular script or
rote recitation of the rights listed.'" State v. Martinez,
2001 UT 12,1122,26 P.3d 203 (quoting Visser, 2000
UT 88 atlf 11,22 P.3d 1242).
[4[ K 10 Plea affidavits or plea statements are properly
used and incorporated into the record when the trial
court determines that the defendant has read the
affidavit or statement, understands its contents, and
acknowledges those contents. State v. Maguire, 830
P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). Proper
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the court time,
eliminate some of the monotony of rote recitation, and
allow a more focused inquiry into the facts of the
offense and whether the plea is knowingly and
voluntarily entered. Mazuire, 830 P.2d at 217-18:
Utah R.Crim. P. 11 advisory committee note.
f5"lf61 f 11 At the time defendant filed his motion to
withdraw, a guilty plea could only be withdrawn upon
good cause shown and *280 with leave of the court.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999). Withdrawal
"is a privilege, not a right, that is left to the trial court's

sound discretion." State v. Gallezos, 738 P.2d 1040,
1041 (Utah 1987): State v. Brocksmith 888 P.2d 703,
704 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Therefore, appellate courts
will not disturb a trial court's determination that a
defendant has failed to show good cause unless it is
clear that the trial court has abused its discretion. State
v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, If 9, 1 P.3d 1108.
r71T81|12 When reviewing the trial court's denial of a
defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the
reviewing court may consider the record of the plea
proceedings, including the plea colloquy and plea
affidavit or statement. Visser, 2000 UT 88 at Iff? 4-5,
12, 22 P.3d 1242: Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (stating
that compliance may be demonstrated on appeal by
reference to the record of the plea proceedings). Thus,
review of a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw
is not limited to the denial of the motion itself. The
precedent in both the Utah and federal courts
demonstrates that courts consistently consider the plea
colloquy in reviewing the denial of a defendant's motion
to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v. Vonn, 535
U.S. 55. 59, 122 S.Ct 1043. 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002):
Visser, 2000 UT 88 at f 4. 22 P.3d 1242. Moreover,
appellate review of the trial court's denial of a
defendant's motion to withdraw may also consider the
facts and circumstances in which the plea was taken.
See Visser, 2000 UT 88 at If 13. 22 P.3d 1242 (stating
the trial court's colloquy, "in light of the mid-trial
context of the plea," provided an adequate basis to
conclude that the trial court had complied with rule 11).
f9iriQiriliri21 % 13 Finally, in general, appellate
courts will not consider an issue, including
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on
appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or
the case involves exceptional circumstances. State v.
Holsate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346. A proper
objection "puts the judge on notice of the asserted error
and allows the opportunity for correction at that time in
the course of the proceeding." Broberg v. Hess, 782
P.2d 198.201 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). Moreover, the issue
must be "sufficiently raised to a 'level of consciousness'
before the trial court and must be supported by
evidence or relevant legal authority." State v. Schultz,
2002 UT A P P 366. 11 19. 58 P.3d 879 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Failure to raise and
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argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that
forum denies the trial court " 'the opportunity to make
any findings of fact or conclusions of law'" concerning
the claimed error. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360
(quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enter., 823 P.2d
479, 483 n. 6 (Utah Ct.App.1991)).
[1311f 14 In this case, Dean's argument that the trial
court failed to comply with rule 11 was not properly
preserved below. Dean's motion to withdraw and the
asserted grounds therefor failed to put the trial court on
notice of the alleged error. Dean did not sufficiently
bring the issue to the court's attention in his motion to
withdraw, nor was it supported by evidence or relevant
legal authority. Instead, Dean vaguely asserted that
there were "two significant departures" from due
process and equal protection. He did not indicate what
those departures were, denying the trial court the
opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Therefore, we can only address this argument
under a plain error analysis. In conducting this
analysis, we will consider the record of the plea
proceedings, the plea statement, and the plea colloquy.
II. PLAIN ERROR
ri4iri51 f 15 To demonstrate plain error, a defendant
must establish that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant." Holsate, 2000 UT 74 at f 13, 10 P.3d
346 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993)). "If any one of these requirements is not
met, plain error is not established." Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1209 (citations omitted).
A. Obvious Error
ri61 Tf 16 We turn first to the element of obviousness.
To establish that the error *281 should have been
obvious to the trial court, Dean must show that the law
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged
error was made. See State v. Eldredze, 113 P.2d 29,
35-36 (Utah 1989) (rejecting a claim of plain error
where a dispositive appellate case had not yet been
decided); see also State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236, 239
(Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating "error is not plain where
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there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court").
If 17 In this context and on these facts, we find that any
error committed by the trial court was not obvious at
the time the court denied Dean's motion to withdraw.
First, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion
that the trial court's alleged error should have been
obvious in light of the decisions in State v.
Tarnawiecki, 2000UT App 186,5 P.3d 1222, andSfofe
V, Hittle. 2002 UT App 134. 47 P.3d 101. As the
dissent in the court of appeals' decision pointed out,
both of these cases were decided after Dean pled guilty
and made his motion to withdraw. Dean entered his
guilty plea on March 8,2000, and sought its withdrawal
on April 10, 2000; however, the Tarnawiecki and
Hittle opinions were not issued until June 15,2000, and
April 25, 2002, respectively. Therefore, neither
decision was available to guide the trial court at the
time of Dean's plea or when it considered his motion to
withdraw.
\ 18 Second, the law in this area was not sufficiently
clear or plainly settled. This was true with respect to
both Utah and federal case law. In Visser, we held that
the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 even
though it did not specifically inform the defendant of
his "right to a speedy public trial before an impartial
jury." 2000 UT 88 at f 13, 22 P.3d 1242. Taking into
account the context of the plea, we held that because the
trial court's colloquy provided an adequate basis to
conclude that the rule 11 requirements had been
fulfilled, the court's omission of the words "speedy" and
"impartial" did not justify withdrawal of the defendant's
plea. Id.
K 19 In addition, federal law in this area was not
well-settled, and some federal courts have held that
exclusion of a specific word in the plea colloquy does
not always constitute error sufficient to justify
withdrawal. See United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d
491, 493 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burnett, 671
F.2d 709, 711-12 (2d Cir.1982) (failure to inform the
defendant of the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him was not proper justification for
withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea).
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If 20 The defendant in Rubalcaba, for example, was
advised that by pleading guilty he was waiving his
"rightto trial." Id at493 (emphasis added). However,
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that the court "inform the defendant of, and
determine that the defendant understands... the right to
y'ury trial." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(emphasisadded).
The defendant argued that because the trial court failed
to include the word "jury" when describing his rule 11
rights, he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty
plea. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d at 493. The appellate court
disagreed and found the trial court's statement that the
defendant was waiving his right to "trial" rather than
"jury trial" was not a fair and just reason to permit the
defendant's withdrawal of his plea.M at 493.

performance must have "affected the outcome of the
plea process." Id. Similarly, establishing harm in the
present context generally requires the defendant's
assertion that "but for" the alleged error, he or she
would not have pled guilty. See State v. Martinez, 2001
UT 12, f 17, 26 P.3d 203 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

H 21 As Visser and Rubalcaba demonstrate, the law in
this area was not plainly settled so as to have adequately
guided the trial court at the time Dean's plea was
entered. It was not clear that the omission of particular
words during plea colloquies constituted obvious error
and justification for a defendant to withdraw his or her
plea. We therefore hold that the trial court's statement
that Dean had the right to a "trial by jury" rather than "a
speedy public trial before an impartial jury" was not
obvious error.

T201 ^f 23 In the instant case, Dean has never asserted
that the trial court's alleged error prejudiced him in any
way. Dean argues that "[sjince a right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury is a substantial
constitutional right, the need to make a separate finding
of harm is unnecessary and presumed to be harmful if
the trial court fails to inform a defendant accordingly."
We disagree, and hold that Dean was required to show
that any error by the court actually "affected the
outcome of the plea process." Parsons, 871 P.2d at
525. Dean did not argue that but for the court's
omission of the words "speedy" and "impartial" he
would not have pled guilty and would have gone to
trial. Therefore, he has failed to satisfy the third
element of plain error analysis. See State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (stating where harm is
not shown, plain error is not established).

B. Harmful Error

CONCLUSION

ri7iri8iri91 f 22 Under the plain error doctrine, a
defendant must not only demonstrate that the error was
obvious, but also that it was harmful or "of such a
magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the defendant." State v.
Evans, 2001 UT 22,If16, 20 P.3d 888; Hoteate, 2000
UT 74 at 11 13, 10P.3d346. This harmfulness test is
equivalent to the prejudice test applied in assessing
claims of *282 ineffective assistance of counsel. State
v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, If 10, 4 P.3d 778. "Where a
defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show
a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.' " Parsons v. Barnes,
871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d
203 (1985)).
Therefore, counsel's deficient

K 24 Having concluded that Dean failed to establish
either that any error by the trial court was obvious or
that he was harmed by any such error, we decline to
find plain error. JFN2] We reverse the court of appeals
and affirm the trial court's denial of Dean's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

FN2. Our holding is not intended to
undermine our consistent emphasis on
compliance with rule 11 in all plea
proceedings. See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d
371, 372-73 (Utah 1996): State v. Gibbons.
740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). The plea
statement used in this case requires review and
the words "speedy" and "impartial" should be
added to remove any possibility of future
challenges resembling the one currently before
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us. Likewise, trial judges should be attentive
to the nuances of rule 1 l's language as they
use and rely on plea statements. The
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty
Plea, found as Form 1 in the Appendix of
Forms to the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, will M[w]hen properly filled out"
comprise a "statement for purposes of strict
compliance with Rule 11 r.l" Utah R.Crim. P.,
Appendix of Forms (2003).

f 25 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING
concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion.
95 P.3d 276, 505 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2004 UT 63
END OF DOCUMENT
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H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Carolyn Roberts MANNING, Petitioner and
Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Respondent and Appellee.
r\(t

Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed
for correctness, on which the Court of Appeals gives no
deference to the post-conviction court's conclusion.
121 Criminal Law €=^>1134(3)
110k 1134(3) Most Cited Cases

."I'fMiLMHHM <' \

April 1, 2004.

Background: Petitioner moved for postconviction
relief. The Third District, Salt Lake Department, Judith
S. Atherton, denied the motion. Petitioner appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:
(1) a petitioner seeking to challenge the validity of her
convictions may not circumventthe requirements of the
Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) by styling her
petition as one filed under the rule governing
extraordinary relief;
(2) petitioner could not demonstrate that her right to
appeal conviction based upon her guilty plea was
denied;
(3) petitioner's time for appeal from conviction based
on guilty plea could not have been extended;
(4) even assuming post-conviction relief petitioner was
given incomplete information regarding the nature of
her right to appeal, she was aware of limited time within
which she was required to appeal; and
(5) alleged failure of petitioner's trial counsel to advise
petitioner about specific details of her limited right to
appeal from conviction based on guilty plea did not
constitute ineffective assistance.

Interpretation of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
presents questions of law, which the Court of Appeals
reviews for correctness and without deference to the
lower court's conclusion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 65B,
65C.
131 Criminal Law €=^1069(6)
110k 1069(6) Most Cited Cases
If an appeal is not timely filed, the Court of Appeals
lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Rules App.Proc,
Rule 4(a).
J41 Criminal Law €==>1069(5)
110k 1069(5) Most Cited Cases
[41 Sentencing and Punishment C=?2221
350Hk2221 Most Cited Cases
141 Sentencing and Punishment €=?2250
350Hk2250 Most Cited Cases
In circumstances where the right to appeal has been
denied, the trial court may resentence a criminal
defendant nunc pro tunc to provide the defendant with
an opportunity to file a timely appeal.
151 Courts €^>207.1
106k207.1 Most Cited Cases

Affirmed.

West Headnotes
[j 1 Criminal Law €^>1134(10)

Because the postconviction relief rule governs
proceedings filed under the Post Conviction Remedies
Act (PCRA), which is the governing statute for any
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a
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criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal
remedies, the civil rule governing extraordinary relief
is not applicable in a challenge focused on a criminal
conviction, even if a restriction on liberty results from
the conviction. U.C.A.1953, 78- 35a-102(l), Rules
Civ.Proc. Rules 65B, 65C.
£61 Courts €=^207.1
106k207.1 Most Cited Cases
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Post-conviction relief petitioner could not demonstrate
that her right to appeal conviction based upon her guilty
plea was denied; record did not support her claim that
she was given incomplete advice regarding
consequences of guilty plea and limited right to appeal,
as her plea affidavit stated she understood she was
waiving her right to appeal, trial judge told her that her
right to appeal was very limited, and she was told she
had 30 days to withdraw her guilty plea, which she
never sought to do.

The plain language of the state rules of civil procedure
demonstrates the distinction between a petition for
postconviction relief, which is governed by the civil
rule on postconviction relief, and a petition for
wrongful restraint on personal liberty, which is
governed by the civil rule on extraordinary relief, and
a petitioner seeking to challenge the validity of her
convictions may not circumvent the requirements of the
Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) by styling her
petition as one filed under the rule governing
extraordinary relief; such petitioners must proceed
under the PCRA and the civil rule on postconviction
relief. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 65B, 65C.

Once defendant has been given sufficient information to
allow court to find that defendant has been advised of
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw his or her
plea and has been advised that the right of appeal is
limited, it is up to the defendant to exercise the right.
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 1 l(e)(7. 8).

121 Criminal Law €=^1426(2)
110k 1426(2) Most Cited Cases

fill Criminal Law €==>1081(6)
110kl081(6) Most Cited Cases

Though postconviction relief may have its roots in the
ancient writ of habeas corpus, it does not follow that the
two may be used interchangeably, especially given the
subsequent enactment of the Post Conviction Remedies
Act (PCRA). Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 65B, 65C.

Post-conviction relief petitioner's time for appeal from
conviction based on guilty plea could not have been
extended under rule providing that trial court, upon
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, could
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, since
petitioner did not file a motion pursuant to rule and
there was no showing of excusable neglect or good
cause that would have given trial court discretion to
extend time for filing appeal. Rules App.Proc, Rule
4(e).

181 Statutes €=>206
361k2Q6 Most Cited Cases
The Court of Appeals seeks to render all parts of a
statute relevant and meaningful, and it avoids
interpretations that will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative.
191 Criminal Law €=>1026.10(2.1)
HOkl026.10(2.1) Most Cited Cases
121 Criminal Law €^1026.10(3)
110kl026.10(3) Most Cited Cases

HOI Criminal Law €=^273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
HOI Criminal Law €=>1026.10(3)
110kl026.10(3) Most Cited Cases

[121 Criminal Law €^>273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Accused.
Even assuming post-conviction relief petitioner was
given incomplete information regarding the nature of
her right to appeal from conviction based on guilty plea,
she was aware that there was a limited time frame
within which she could seek to withdraw her plea, and
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she did not seek to do so.
[131 Criminal Law €^>1026.10(3)
110kl026.10(3) Most Cited Cases
A defendant cannot simply appeal a conviction based
on a guilty plea, but must first file a motion to withdraw
the plea, giving the court who took the plea the first
chance to consider defendant's arguments.
[141 Criminal Law €==>641.13(5)
110k641.13(5) Most Cited Cases
[14] Criminal Law €=^641.13(7)
110k641.13(7) Most Cited Cases
Alleged failure of post-conviction reliefpetitioner's trial
counsel to advise petitioner about specific details of her
limited right to appeal from conviction based on guilty
plea did not constitute ineffective assistance; attorney
stated at plea hearing that petitioner had participated in
preparation of plea statement, petitioner had stated that
attorney adequately and properly served her, she did not
request an appeal, and she met several times with her
attorney after sentencing, during which she could have
aired any dissatisfaction with sentence or interest in
appealing. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.
*198 Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and Laura B.
Dupaix. Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.

Before Judges BILLINGS. DAVIS, and ORME.

OPINION
ORME. Judge:
f 1 Carolyn Manning appeals the trial court's denial of
her petition for postconviction relief, which was
brought over a year after she entered her guilty pleas.
She contends that because she was not fully informed
by her counsel and the trial court of the nature of her

right to appeal, the trial court's refusal to resentence her
constitutes a denial of her constitutional right to appeal.
We affirm the trial court's denial of her motion and
clarify the procedures for attacking guilty pleas and the
availability of resentencing as a means to cure a missed
opportunity to appeal.

BACKGROUND
% 2 Manning was originally charged with three counts
of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, one
count of failure to render a proper tax return, and two
counts of theft by deception. Under the terms of a plea
agreement, Manning pled guilty to one count of
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, a second
degree felony; one count of failing to file a proper tax
return, a third degree felony; and one count of theft, a
third degree felony. The agreement also called for
Manning to pay restitution to her victims. In exchange,
the State agreed to dismiss the other counts.
f 3 In her written plea statement and at the plea
hearing, Manning acknowledged that by entering a
guilty plea she was waiving certain rights, including her
right to appeal the conviction. In July 2001, she signed
a statement, which she had reviewed with counsel,
confirming that she intended to enter a guilty plea. The
statement explained each of her rights that would be
waived by voluntarily entering a guilty plea, including
that the "right of appeal is limited." In *199 contrast, if
she "were tried and convicted by a jury or by a judge,
[she] would have the right to appeal [her] conviction
and sentence." The statement further explained that by
pleading guilty she was "not preserving any issue for
appeal relative to the Court's rulings on pre-trial
motions or based upon statutory or constitutional
challenges" and that she understood that by pleading
guilty she waived her "rights to file an appeal." The
statement also provided notice of the "time limits for
withdrawing pleas" and indicated that such a request
"must be made by motion within 30 days after the entry
of the plea" [FN 11 and that the plea may be withdrawn
only "upon a showing of good cause and with leave of
the Court."

FN1. This statement was made just weeks
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before issuance of the Utah Supreme Court's
opinion in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31
P.3d 528, which held "that the thirty-day
limitation on the filing of a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest runs
from the date of final disposition of the case at
the district court," id. at If 11, rather than from
the time of entry of the plea.

notice of appeal, which this court later dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. In an unpublished decision, this
court explained that when a notice of appeal is filed
beyond the 30-day appeal deadline, see UtahR.App. P.
4(a), we lack appellate jurisdiction, and Manning's only
remedy if she was deprived of the right to appeal was to
seek postconviction relief under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

If 4 At the plea hearing in July 2001, Manning was
represented by counsel, and the trial court engaged her
in a colloquy before accepting her plea. During the
course of the colloquy, the court determined that
Manning understood the proceedings against her and
was competent to enter a guilty plea. Her attorney
stated that she is "a bright lady" who was "educated
through the 15th grade" and that she had "participated
in the preparation o f the written plea statement.
Manning stated that her attorney had "taken the time to
extend himself to adequately and properly serve me,
and I'm satisfied with his service." The court explained
that the "third degree felonies may carry with them an
indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of zero to
five years"; "[t]he second degree felony can carry with
it an indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of one
to fifteen years"; and "there is a substantial amount of
restitution that will be ordered." The court reviewed
with Manning the trial rights she would forego by
pleading guilty and stated that her "right to appeal these
pleas of guilty is very limited." After accepting her
guilty pleas, the court informed her of her right to file
a motion to withdraw the pleas within 30 days.
If 5 On September 27,2001, Manning was sentenced to
the statutory term of imprisonment for each offense,
which prison terms were suspended except for one year,
and she was given credit for time already served, which
was approximately four months. She was placed on
probation for thirty-six months and was ordered to pay
restitution in the tentative amount of $210,000 to her
individual victims and $ 19,431.24 to the Utah State Tax
Commission. At sentencing, defense counsel indicated
that he had "spoken to Ms. Manning about the real
probability that [incarceration] was going to happen."

f 7 On July 31, 2002, Manning filed a petition in the
district court "pursuant to Rule 65Bfb) and/or 65C [of
the] Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an extraordinary
writ allowing her to be sentenced nunc pro tunc ...
thereby extending the time in which to file a notice of
appeal." Her primary claim was that her right to appeal
and right to counsel had "been violated by the failure to
file a timely notice of appeal from her conviction." The
district court denied her petition for postconviction
relief, finding that Manning "was informed by the court
of her limited right to appeal," "was represented by very
competent counsel," and had "not established that she
was unconst itutionally denied her right to appeal."
Manning now appeals that ruling.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
nif"21 U 8 Manning argues that the trial court "erred in
refusing to resentence her nunc pro tunc." She contends
that she "was deprived of her constitutional right to
appeal" and "was also deprived of the right to *200
counsel during the period for perfecting an appeal."
"Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed
for correctness, [on which we give] no deference to the
post-conviction court's conclusion."
Wickham v.
Galetka. 2002 UT 72,f 7, 61 P.3d 978. Accord
Moench v. State, 2002 UT ADD 333, If 4, 57 P.3d 1116.
Likewise, interpretation of the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, rule 65C, and rule 65B "present[ ]
question[s] of law, which we also review for correctness
and without deference to the lower court's conclusion."
Moench 2002 UT ADD 333 at If 5. 57 P.3d 1116. See
Platts v. Parents Helyim Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661
(Utah 1997) (stating that "matters of statutory
construction are questions of law that are reviewed for
correctness").

\ 6 On November 23, 2001, Manning filed a pro se
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ANALYSIS
mr41 If 9 The Utah Constitution provides that "[i]n
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
... appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the right of appeal
[is] essential to a fair criminal proceeding" and it cannot
be "lightly forfeited." State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703,
704 (Utah 1985). However, appeals must be filed
"within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment
or order appealed from." Utah R.App. P. 4(a). It is
well established that "[i]f an appeal is not timely filed,
this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato
v. Utah Transit Auth. 2000 UT App 299.11 7. 13 P.3d
616, cert, denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). The Utah
Supreme Court has warned that extraordinary writs
"must not" be used to "make a mockery of the time
limits for appeal, undermine the finality of criminal
judgments, and promote the indefensible
merry-go-round of collateral attack." Bozzess v.
Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981). Nonetheless, in
circumstances where the right to appeal has been
denied, the trial court may resentence a criminal
defendant nunc pro tunc to provide the defendant with
an opportunity to file a timely appeal. See id_ (granting
extraordinary relief where petitioner requested that
counsel pursue an appeal but counsel failed to file a
notice of appeal); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38
(Utah 1981). TFN21 Manning contends it was error for
the lower court to refuse to resentence her.

FN2. As aptly stated in State v. Johnson, 635
P.2d36(Utah 1981), "[n]unc pro tunc, which
means 'now for then,' is probably a misnomer
for this circumstance, where the court is
resentencing to give the judgment of
conviction not retroactive but present effect."
Id. at 38 n. 1. Although Johnson suggests
changing the terminology to "tunc pro nunc,"
id, perhaps it is less confusing to forego the
quest for the perfect Latin phrase and simply
describe the requested action as
"resentencing."

I. Resentencing

^[ 10 Utah cases have recognized that in certain limited
circumstances a defendant should be resentenced in
order to revive the right to appeal. In State v. Johnson,
635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), the criminal defendant
claimed that his attorney agreed to file a notice of
appeal after sentencing, but the attorney failed to follow
through. See id. at 37. Having learned of the first
attorney's failure, the defendant contacted a second
attorney while still within the 30-day period for filing
an appeal, "but through some misunderstanding" a
timely appeal was not filed. Id_ The Court denied the
defendant's request to extend the time for filing because
"[t]he 30-day period ... is jurisdictional and cannot be
enlarged" but explained that due to the "important
interests involved," which made "further proceedings
desirable," the trial court could take evidence to
determine whether the defendant's constitutional right
to appeal the conviction had been denied. Id_ The
Court stated that "[i]f the facts alleged by the defendant
are true ... defendant was denied a constitutional right
and must be provided an opportunity to take a direct
appeal from his conviction." Id. at 38. As the remedy
for such a denial, the Court adopted the resentencing
procedure described in People v. Callaway, 24 N. Y.2d
127, 299 N.Y.S.2d 154, 247 N.E.2d 128, 130
(N.Y.I969), whereby the act of resentencing starts a
new 30-day period for filing an appeal. See Johnson,
635P.2dat38.
| 11 Similarly, in Bozzess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39
(Utah 1981), the defendant filed a notice of appeal
almost seven months after *201 he was sentenced,
claiming, among other things, ineffective assistance of
counsel. See id. at 40. "After his conviction and again
at the time of his sentencing, defendant advised his
appointed counsel that he did not want to appealf, but
ajfter he arrived at the state prison, defendant changed
his mind" and so advised his attorney. Id_ The Court
determined that "[cjounsel erred in not filing the notice
of appeal" because the defendant's letter asking his
attorney to file an appeal reached the attorney the day
before the expiration of the time for filing a notice of
appeal. Id_ The Court stated that "[t]he error in this
case goes to the availability of the appeal" and "[i]f the
facts found by the [trial] court establish that the right to
appeal was denied, that court is then empowered to
resentence the defendant nunc pro tunc." Id. at 42-43.
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II. Procedural Confusion
If 12 There is widespread confusion about the exact
procedure to be followed in cases like the instant one,
where resentencing to resurrect the right to appeal is the
objective, as typified by Manning's invocation of "Rule
65B(b) and/or 65C [of the] Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." Given the recurring nature of this problem,
we take the opportunity to illuminate the historical
reasons for this confusion and to clarify the correct
procedural approach.
f 13 At the time that Johnson and Bozzess were
decided, "[t]he appropriate remedy [was] amotion for
relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
65B(i)," which authorized the trial court, "if it [found]
in favor of the complainant, to 'enter an appropriate
order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the
former proceedings ... as the court may deem just and
proper in the case.' " Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (third
alteration in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(i)(8) (1977)). rFN31 The Utah Supreme Court
explained that "[t]he postconviction hearing procedure
is a successor to the common-law writ of error coram
nobis." Id_ A writ of error coram nobis is "[a] writ of
error directed to a court for review of its own judgment
and predicated on alleged errors of fact." Black's Law
Dictionary 338 (7th ed.1999). It can be distinguished
from the more familiar writ of habeas corpus, which is
"employed to bring a person before a court, most
frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or
detention is not illegal." Id. at 715.

FN3. For clarity, we include the dates certain
rules were adopted as we discuss the evolution
of postconviction relief as dealt with in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
[Coram nobis], which [the Utah Supreme Court]
declared to be available in Utah in appropriate cases,
Neal v. Beckstead 3 Utah 2d 403. 285 P.2d 129
(1955), was used by a sentencing court to modify or
vacate a judgment of conviction on the basis of facts
which, without defendant's fault, did not appear on
the face of the record and as to which defendant was
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without other remedy. State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 148,
514 P.2d 809 (1973): Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d
85, 448 P.2d 907 (1968). Thus, coram nobis could
be used, in carefully limited circumstances, to modify
or vacate a judgment where extra-record facts
showed that the defendant had been deprived of his
constitutional right to a fair trial, including the right
to the assistance of counsel.
Johnson, 635P.2dat38.
\ 14 Again, when Johnson and Bozzess were decided
in 1981, rule 65B(i) governed postconviction relief in
Utah. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) (1977) (stating that
"[a]ny person imprisoned... under a commitment of any
court ... who asserts that in any proceedings which
resulted in his commitment there was a substantial
denial of his [constitutional] rights ... may institute a
proceeding under this Rule").
Rule 65B was
reorganized and revised in 1991, see Utah R. Civ. P.
65B (1992) advisory committee note, so that
postconviction relief was thereafter governed by rule
65B(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (1992) (stating that
"[a]ny person committed by a court to imprisonment...
who asserts that the commitment resulted from a
substantial denial of rights may petition the court for
relief under this paragraph"); Utah R. Civ. P. 65B
(1992) advisory committee note (stating that
"[pjaragraph (b) ... replaces subparagraph (i) of the
former rule").
*202 III. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act and
Rule 65C
Tf 15 In 1996, as a result of coordinated efforts by all
three branches of state government, the Legislature
enacted the Post Conviction Remedies Act (the PCRA)
and the Utah Supreme Court promulgatedrule_6^C. See
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002); Utah
R. Civ. P. 65C (Supp.1996 & 2003). Both became
effective on July 1, 1996. The PCRA "establishes a
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges
a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who
has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a
direct appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(l)
(2002). Under the PCRA,
a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a
criminal offense may file an action in the district

Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 7

89P.3dl96
89 P.3d 196, 496 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 2004 UT App 87
(Cite as: 89 P.3d 196)

court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief
to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon
the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was
imposed in violation ofthe United States Constitution
or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner
was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner,
or probation was revoked in an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that
requires the court to vacate the conviction or
sentence....
Utah Code Ann. S 78-35a-104(l)(a)-(e) (2002).
K 16 Sections 106 and 107 of the PCRA preclude relief
in certain circumstances. "A person is not eligible for
relief ... upon any ground that," among other things,
"could have been but was not raised at trial or on
appeal," id § 78-35a-106(l)(c), unless "the failure to
raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of
counsel." Id § 78-35a-106(2). Also, "[a] petitioner is
entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one
year after the cause of action has accrued," id. §
78-35a-107(l), although "a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations" if
it finds that "the interests of justice [so] require." TFN41
Id §78-35a-107(3).

FN4. The "interests of justice" escape valve
alleviates the concern we expressed in Currier
v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct.App.),
cert denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994). In
Currier, we struck down the former statute of
limitations governing postconviction relief
because it was "a rigid three-month limitation"
that did not "include a provision excusing
delay on the grounds of good cause." Id. at
1368 & n. 18. At least partly in response to
our decision in Currier, the Legislature
enacted the current provision, lengthening the

time period to one year and adding the
"interests of justice" exception, see Julian v.
State. 966 P.2d 249, 251 n. 3 (Utah 1998),
which, as we have previously held and affirm
today, " 'must always [be] consider[ed] ...
when a petitioner raises meritorious claims.'"
Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 965 4, 976 P.2d
100 (quoting Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849,
851 (Utah 1998)(pluralitv opinion)) (emphasis
in original).

f 17 The PCRA also states that "[procedural
provisions for filing and commencement of a petition
are found in Rule 65C Tof the! Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." Utah Code Ann, g 78-35a-l 02(1) (2002).
Rule 65C, entitled "Post-conviction relief," "replacefd]
former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B," Utah R. Civ. P.
65C (1997) advisory committee note, and now
"govern[s] proceedings in all petitions for
post-conviction relief filed under [the PCRA]." UtahR.
Civ. P. 65C(a) (2003). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65B
(1997) advisory committee note (stating that "[t]he
1996 amendment deleted former Subdivision (b)... the
provisions of which have been transferred to Rule
65C"); Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17,111 n. 1, 20 P.3d
382 (noting that "rule 65B(b) was renumbered and is
currently designated as rule 65C").
IV. Distinguishing Rule 65B
£52 TI18 The basis upon which "a person may petition
the court for extraordinary relief under rule 65B now
only includes
*203 any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b)
(involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty),
paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public
or corporate authority), or paragraph (d) (involving
the wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to
exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of
Pardons and Parole).
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (2003). The use of rule 65B is
limited to cases "[w]here no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is available," and the scope of relief
under paragraph (b) for "[w]rongfiil restraints on
personal liberty," Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)-(b), is now
narrowed to "proceedings involving wrongful restraint
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on personal liberty other than those governed by Rule
65C." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (2003) advisory committee
note (emphasis added). Therefore, because rule 65C
governs proceedings filed under the PCRA, which is the
governing statute for "any person who challenges a
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who
has exhausted all other legal remedies," Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-102(l), rule 65B is not applicable in a
challenge focused on a criminal conviction, even if a
restriction on liberty results from the conviction.
£61 Tf 19 In addition, there is a very important
procedural distinction between the two provisions:
Petitioners alleging "[w]rongfiil restraint on personal
liberty" under rule 65B(b) must "fil[e] a petition with
the clerk of the court in the district in which [they are]
restrained," Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) (2003), while
petitions for postconviction relief must be filed in "the
district court in the county in which the judgment of
conviction was entered." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b)
(2003).
r71T81 H 20 Thus, the plain language of our rules of
civil procedure demonstrates the distinction between a
petition for postconviction relief, which is governed by
rule 65C, and a petition for wrongful restraint on
personal liberty, which is governed by rule 65B(b), see
Divoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61,11 11, 29 P.3d 1225
(stating that courts should "look[ ] to the plain language
of the applicable rule when construing it"), and we
conclude that a petitioner seeking to challenge the
validity of her conviction(s) may not circumvent the
requirements of the PCRA by styling her petition as one
filed under rule 65B(b). [FN51 Rather, *204 such
petitioners must proceed under the PCRA and rule 65C.
See Julian v. State, 2002 UT 615 4, 52 P.3d 1168
(recognizing that "[t]he PCRA replaced prior
post-conviction remedies with a statutory, 'substantive
legal remedy for any person who challenges a
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who
has exhausted all other legal remedies'") (quoting Utah
Code Ann, g 78-35a-102). A contrary holding would
render rule 65C and the PCRA superfluous, and "we
seek 'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and
meaningful,1 and we 'avoid interpretations that will
render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'
" State v Tooele County, 2002 UT 8,Tf 10,44 P.3d 680
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(citations omitted).

FN5. In so holding, we acknowledge that,
prior to the enactment of the PCRA and rule
65C, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta
that " 'post-conviction proceedings' [are] a
branch of habeas corpus" and that the two
form a "single constitutional remedy." Hurst
v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029.1033-34 (Utah 1989).
In Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
P.2d 677 (Utah 1995). the Court explained:
In its early history, a writ of habeas corpus
was classically used to challenge the
lawfulness of a physical restraint under which
a person was held or the jurisdiction and
sentence of a court that convicted a person....
Later, the scope of the writ was expanded to
provide a post-conviction remedy in unusual
circumstances to determine whether a person
was convicted in violation of principles of
fundamental fairness or whether the sentence
imposed is void.... In addition, a writ of
habeas corpus may be used to challenge cruel
or oppressive conditions of imprisonment.
Id at 681-82 (footnote omitted). See also
Petersen v. Utah Bd of Pardons, 907 P.2d
1148, 1153 &n. 2 (Utah 1995) ("A challenge
to the authority of a governmental agency or
officer to restrain a person's liberty is
classically raised by a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.... It can also be used to
challenge, for example, the terms and
conditions of confmementf,] or, in certain
cases, to challenge the authority of a private
person to restrain the liberty of another.");
Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1990)
("The function of a writ of habeas corpus as a
post-conviction remedy is to provide a means
for collaterally attacking convictions when
they are so constitutionally flawed that they
result in fundamental unfairness and to
provide for collateral attack of sentences not
authorized by law.").
Our decision today is not fundamentally
inconsistent with Utah's pre-PCRA
jurisprudence. Though postconviction relief
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may have its roots in the ancient writ of
habeas corpus, it does not follow that the two
may be used interchangeably, especially given
the subsequent enactment of the PCRA. See
Spain v. Stewart 639 P.2d 166, 168 & n. 2
(Utah 1981) (notifying that petitioner, who
was charged but not convicted for possession
of a controlled substance and was being held
in county jail, properly challenged the legality
of his restraint via rule 65B(f) (now rule
65B(bX), which is "the traditional habeas
corpus [procedure for] assuring that a person
is not 'unjustly imprisoned or otherwise
restrained of his liberty' ";
thus, the
"postconviction hearing provision [of rule]
65B(D" (now rule 65C) did not apply);
Litcerov. Warden, 841 P.2d 1230,1231 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) (noting difference between rule
65B(b) (now rule 65C) and rule 65B(c) (now
rule65B(b)), and stating, "[b]ecause petitioner
challenges the terms and conditions of his
confinement, subparagraph (c) clearly
applies"). Cf. Monson v. Slate, 953 P.2d 73,
73-74 (Utah 1998) (stating that postconviction
claims of defective plea colloquy and
ineffective assistance of counsel are governed
by rule 65B(b) (now rule 65Q); Padilla v.
State Bd of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664,
667 (Utah 1997) (stating that "Rule 65B(c)
[governing wrongful restraint on personal
liberty] cannot be used to challenge Board [of
Pardons] actions that might be challenged
under Rule 65B(e) [governing wrongful use of
judicial authority]") (citation omitted); Earle
v. Warden, 811 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1991)
(concluding that postconviction petition
alleging that trial court committed reversible
error in "refusing to allow [petitioner] to
withdraw his guilty plea" is governed by rule
65B(i) (now rule 65Q); Andrews v. Shulsen,
113 P.2d 832, 833 (Utah 1988) (petition
challenging conviction based on erroneous
jury instruction was "governed by Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 65B(i)" (now 65C));
Lancaster v. Cook, 753 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah
1988) (postconviction claims "challeng[ing]
the validity of [petitioner's] guilty plea" are

governed by rule 65B(i) (now rule 65Q);
Andrews v. Morris, 611 P.2d 81, 85 (Utah
1983) (postconviction claims alleging "denial
of due process and equal protection" are
properly "review [ed] under [r]ule 65B(i)"
(now rule 65C)): Andrews v. Morris, 607
P.2d 816, 818. 821 (Utah) (petitioner's
postconviction claims that he was, inter alia,
"deprived ... of a trial by a fair and impartial
jury" were governed by rule 65B(i) (now rule
65Q), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct.
254, 66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980).
Other jurisdictions, recognizing the difference
between postconviction relief focused on a
conviction and extraordinary relief based on
wrongful restraint of personal liberty, i.e., the
traditional writ of habeas corpus, have
likewise held that postconviction relief is the
proper avenue for challenging a conviction.
See, e.g., Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207,
209-10 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (holding that
petitioner's claims-alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel and challenging his
plea--are p r o p e r l y r e s o l v e d via
"postconviction motion" and relief "may not
be obtained by writ of habeas corpus");
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 924 P.2d
1225, 1228 & n. 1 (Idaho Ct.App.1996)
(stating that "once the time for a direct appeal
has expired, the exclusive vehicle to present a
claim that a conviction or sentence was
entered in violation of constitutional or
statutory law is an application for
post-conviction relief under the [Idaho
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act],"
although "[o]ther types of challenges to an
inmate's incarceration... including challenges
to the conditions of confinement, may
continue to be asserted in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus"); People ex rel Walker v.
Twomev, 9 Ill.App.3d 544. 291 N.E.2d 833,
835(1973) (holding that "[a] claim of denial
of the constitutional right to counsel cannot be
determined on a writ of habeas corpus";
rather, such claim is properly resolved via
"post-conviction petition");
Bates v.
Czerniak, 187 Or.App. 8. 66 P.3d 519. 520
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(2003) (affirming dismissal of habeas corpus
petition challenging guilty plea and noting that
M
[a] petition for post conviction relief is the
exclusive means for challenging the
lawfulness of a criminal conviction and the
proceedings on which it was based[; a]n
individual may not avail himself of habeas
corpus relief for this purpose"), review denied,
69P.3dl232fOr.2003).

If 21 Typify ing--or at least recognizing~the confusion
we seek to ameliorate in this opinion, Manning sought
relief in the trial court "pursuant to Rule 65Bfb) and/or
65C." Manningrelies on State v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4,
63P.3dl20. cert, granted, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003), in
support of her argument that "a defendant who is
requesting resentencing because his right to appeal was
violated can file a petition for extraordinary relief under
rule 65B(b)." Rees was accurate insofar as it suggested
that "coram nobis type relief is still available, id. at f
5 n. 2; however, it was clearly incorrect in stating that
"[former] Rule 65B(i) [is] presently embodied in rule
65B(b)" and that "rule 65Bfb) [is] the successor to the
writ of error coram nobis." Id. at ya 6, 16. Having
clarified that rule 65B(b) is really the successor rule to
the writ of habeas corpus while rule 65C is the
successor to the writ of error coram nobis, JTN6J we
now return to the specific arguments made by Manning.

FN6. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399
n. 3 (Utah 1994) (stating that "[horizontal
stare decisis does not... require that a panel
adhere to its own or another panel's prior
decision with the same inflexibility as does
vertical stare decisis[; i]nstead, although it
may not do so lightly, a panel may overrule its
own or another panel's decision where 'the
decision is clearly erroneous1 ") (citation
omitted), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115
S.Ct.910.130L.Ed.2d792(1995). Given the
Utah Supreme Court's pending consideration
of this court's opinion in State v. Rees, 2003
UTApp4,63P.3dl20, cert, granted, 73P.3d
946 (Utah 2003), we highlight the flaw in its
analysis but see no need to do more.
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We do note that it is of little practical
consequence that Rees enunciated a four-part
test, borrowed from the Ninth Circuit, "that a
petitioner must satisfy before coram nobis
type relief can be granted," id. at H 14, since
those factors substantially track the current
requirements of the PCRA. See Utah Code
Ann. SS 78-35a-104. -106 (2002).
Nevertheless, while the Rees factors may well
serve as a useful guideline in determining
whether a postconviction petition is
meritorious, the substantive and procedural
provisions outlined in the PCRA control and
should be the primary frame of reference in
evaluating such petitions.

*205 V. Analysis of Manning's Claims
\ 22 Manning contends that she "did not knowingly
and voluntarily waive her right to appeal"; "she was
given confusing information as to any right of appeal
she might have after pleading guilty"; she "was also not
told that she was required to file a notice of appeal
within thirty days of sentencing"; and the fact that she
"filed a notice from jail within... fifty-seven days after
sentencing" demonstrates that she "did not waive the
right to appeal." She additionally claims that she "was
not clearly and adequately advised of the nature of her
right to appeal" and she was "deprived of her right to
counsel during the period for perfecting the appeal."
However, she has made no substantive argument as to
how she was prejudiced by missing the opportunity to
appeal or what grounds for appeal existed. [FN71

FN7. Manning's position on appeal is circular,
at best. She seeks to invalidate her guilty plea
because she was not fully advised of her right
to appeal, which she insists should now entitle
her to the opportunity to appeal.
If
resentenced, her principal complaint on
appeal-that she had been misinformed about
her right to appeal when her guilty plea was
taken- would necessarily be mooted.
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A. Denial of the Right to Appeal
If 23 Acknowledging that both Bozzess and Johnson
speak in terms of the right to an appeal being "denied,"
see Bozzess v. Morris. 635 P.2d 39, 39 (Utah 1981);
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981),
Manning nonetheless argues that "the appropriate
inquiry in determining whether a defendant has been
deprived of appeal rights and therefore should be
resentenced is to determine whether the circumstances
demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to appeal." In other words, Manning equates
"denial" of appellate rights with mere waiver of
appellate rights, unless it is shown-apparently by the
State—that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The
State counters that more than passively letting appellate
rights lapse is required by the concept of "denial."
Indeed, in both Bozzess and Johnson attorneys were or
may have been instructed to file appeals but opted or
allegedly opted not to do so. In other words, the
defendants in those cases were denied or possibly
denied their appellate rights due to the malfeasance of
their attorneys.
| 24 To further crystallize the issue framed by the
parties, this explanation may be helpful: Both sides
agree that if a defendant who wishes to appeal is denied
that right-by an attorney who fails to file a notice of
appeal or, say, a prison official who refuses to mail to
an attorney a defendant's instructions to file an
appeal—the defendant should be resentenced to
resurrect the right to appeal. Both sides agree that if a
defendant knows of her right to appeal but voluntarily
chooses to forego it, a change of heart after the 30-day
period for filing an appeal does not entitle her to be
resentenced. The disagreement is about what to do with
cases in the gray area between those two rather clear
situations. Manning contends that if it cannot be shown
that the right to appeal was affirmatively waived, then
it must be concluded that the defendant was denied that
right and is entitled to be resentenced. The State
contends that unless a defendant affirmatively sought to
exercise the right to appeal, and it was denied as a result
of the action or inaction of another person, the
defendant is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of
resentencing.

r9iri01 If 25 Given the facts and holdings of Johnson
and Bozzess, we essentially agree with the State. The
question of whether the right to appeal a conviction has
been denied is a function of availability of that right.
The question is answered by determining whether the
State or defense counsel closes the *206 door to the
right of appeal, or whether the defendant simply
chooses not to open it. In the context of this case,
where Manning pled guilty, all that is required for her
to choose not to exercise the right of appeal is
knowledge that the right exists followed by her own
inaction. The knowledge requirement was satisfied by
the trial court's compliance with rule life) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the
court find that "the defendant has been advised of the
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea"
and "has been advised that the right of appeal is
limited" before the court may accept a guilty plea. Utah
R.Crim.P. 11(e)(7), (8). Once the defendant has been
given sufficient information to allow the court to make
such a finding, it is up to the defendant to exercise the
right. In the present context, in order to conclude that
a criminal defendant has been "denied" that right, the
interference with a defendant's exercise of the right to
appeal must originate in the criminal justice system.
For instance, the mishandling of prison mail by a
corrections officer or the ineffective assistance of
defense counsel would be the basis for resentencing to
restart appeal rights if such occurrences thwarted a
defendant's intention to pursue an appeal. Conversely,
a defendant could not demonstrate that the right to
appeal was "denied" because he relied, to his detriment,
on insights about appellate practice from his fellow
prisoners or on guidance from a brother-in-law whose
"expertise" is limited to regular watching of Court TV.
Neither, as likely occurred in this case, does the late
onset of "buyer's remorse" after several unpleasant
weeks of incarceration equate to "denial" of the right to
appeal.
K 26 Manning relies on several Utah cases to support
her position that appellate rights that are not exercised
are necessarily denied if they are not affirmatively
waived. However, her reliance on these cases is
misplaced. In Bruner v. Carver. 920 P.2d 1153 (Utah
1996), Bruner was sentenced to prison after he was
found guilty of homicide and burglary. See id. at 1154.
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Although his attorneys "filed a timely notice of appeal,"
Bruner indicated that "he 'was thinking about
withdrawing the appeal/ " Id_ His attorneys had an
affidavit delivered to him in prison, which he signed,
stating his desire to "knowingly and voluntarily ...
withdraw [his] appeal." Id. The appeal was then
dismissed and Bruner filed an action seeking to
reinstate the appeal based on the deficient performance
of his counsel. See id. at 1155. He argued, among other
things, that "the withdrawal of his direct appeal was
inconsistent with due process requirements because ...
the district court required him to bear the burden of
proving that the withdrawal of his direct appeal was not
knowing and voluntary." IcL The Court determined that
"because the prior judgment carries a presumption of
validity, the trial court correctly assigned to Bruner the
burden of showing a constitutional violation." Id.
Bruner's "appeal was filed and was proceeding
routinely until he personally requested that it be
withdrawn." Id. at 1156. Therefore, there was no
question as to whether the right to appeal had been
denied; instead it was a question of whether he
voluntarily chose to withdraw the appeal. Thus, Bruner
was not within the gray area mentioned above because
he voluntarily chose to forgo the right to appeal.
fill t 27 Conversely, in cases where another actor
interferes with the defendant's attempt to file an appeal,
it is logical to view the right as having been denied.
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d36,38 (Utah 1981)
(stating that if "within the statutory period for appeal
[defendant] requested counsel to take an appeal and
counsel gave defendant reason to believe that he would
but then failed to do so[, then] defendant was denied a
constitutional right") (emphasis added). In this
instance, Manning was not prevented from filing a
timely appeal, she did not instruct her attorney to file a
timely appeal, no timely appeal was filed, and we have
no occasion to address whether any withdrawal of
appeal was knowing and voluntary JTN8]

FN8, Manning argues that the time for appeal
could have been extended under rule 4(e) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
Utah R.App. 4(e) (stating that "[t]he trial
court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
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good cause, may extend the time for filing a
notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the [30day period] prescribed by paragraph (a) of this
rule"). However, this argument is without
merit because Manning did not file a motion
pursuant to rule 4(e) and there is no "showing
of excusable neglect or good cause" that
would have given the trial court discretion to
extend the time for filing an appeal. Id.

*207 \ 28 Manning's reliance on State v. Turtle, 713
P.2d 703 (Utah 1985). is also unavailing. That case
arose in a distinct context that offers no insight in to
how to deal with "gray area" cases generally. In Tuttle,
the defendant was convicted and sentenced, filed a
notice of appeal, and then escaped from prison. See id_
at 704. After Turtle's escape, the Utah Supreme Court
dismissed his appeal, stating that "one who escapes
places himselfbeyond the reach of the judicial system,"
but upon his return to the State's custody the appeal was
reinstated. H The Court rejected the State's argument
that Tuttle "abandoned his appeal" by escaping and
decided that the "more reasonable assumption [was]
that the escapee ha[d] not even considered how his
escape [would] affect his appeal rights." Id^ The Court
determined that "automatically denying reinstatement of
an escapee's appeal upon a return to custody really
amounts to imposition by this Court of a punishment for
escape." Id. at 704-05. Thus, due to the "serious due
process and equal protection questions" raised by
refusing to reinstate an escapee's appeal, id. at 705, it
could not be concluded that Tuttle voluntarily chose to
forgo the right to appeal.
K 29 Manning argues that she "was not clearly and
adequately advised of the nature of her right to appeal."
The suggestion is that this incomplete advice-she does
not contend she was affirmatively misled about her right
to appeal-worked a denial of her right to appeal.
However, the record does not support her claim. Her
plea affidavit included the following sentence: "I
understand that by pleading guilty/no contest I am
waiving my rights to file an appeal." At the plea
hearing, however, after explaining the rights associated
with trial, the judge correctly stated: "Your right to
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appeal these pleas of guilty is very limited. You
understand that to be the case?" Manning was
additionally informed by the court at the plea hearing
that she had 30 days to withdraw her guilty plea, which
she never sought to do. TFN91

FN9. Manning claims that the court erred in
its failure to inform her, after the issuance of
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528, that she had
30 days from sentencing in which to file a
motion to withdraw her plea. See supra note
1. However, she concedes that this error does
not affect this appeal because she never sought
to withdraw her guilty plea.

ri2iri311f 30 It is well established that "a defendant
[can] not simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty
plea[, but] must first file a motion to withdraw [the]
plea, giving the court who took the plea the first chance
to consider defendant's arguments." Summers v. Cook,
759 P.2d341, 342 OJtahCt.App. 1988). The "failureto
do so extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the
validity of the guilty plea on appeal." State v. Reyes,
2002 UT 13,If 3,40 P.3d 630. Thus, even if we assume
that Manning was given incomplete information
regarding the nature of her right to appeal, [FN 10] she
was aware that *208 there was a limited time frame
within which she could seek to withdraw her plea, and
she admits she never filed a motion to withdraw her
plea.

FN10. As indicated above, see supra note 7, it
is difficult to see where this argument, even if
successful, leads Manning. The usual thrust of
an argument raising a problem with a plea
colloquy is that the plea was not knowingly
and voluntarily entered due to the trial court's
failure to comply with rule 11. See Utah
R.Crim. P. 11. See also In re Hill 621 P.2d
705, 706-07 (Utah 1980) (holding that
unrepresented defendant was allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea due to trial court's
failure to explain the con sequences of his

plea); State v. Tarnawiecki 2000 UT App
186, If 1f 16-18, 5 P.3d 1222 (holding that
defendant was allowed to withdraw guilty plea
due to trial court's failure to advise her of right
to speedy trial before impartial jury). In other
words, with reference to the cases cited,
Tarnawiecki would likely not have pled guilty
if she had known of her right to a speedy trial
before an impartial jury, and Hill would not
have pled guilty if he had known the
consequences of pleading guilty to a felony.
That logic does not apply to Manning, who
knew her rights associated with trial and the
consequences of her plea. Her only claim is
that she did not fully understand the nature of
her right to appeal. The court stated that her
"right to appeal these pleas of guilty is very
limited," and the plea statement indicated that
by pleading guilty she waived her "rights to
file an appeal." Even if she understood that
her right to appeal was more limited than it
actually was, it is illogical for her to argue that
she would not have entered a guilty plea if she
had known that the right of appeal was
actually more extensive than she believed. In
fact, she is in the same position as a defendant
who pled guilty after being told that she had
the right to be acquitted within the next week,
when in fact she only had the right to a speedy
trial before an impartial jury. She is also in
the same position as a defendant who pled
guilty even though he was told that the
maximum punishment was being burned at the
stake, when in fact a brief jail sentence was
the maximum available sanction. There is no
prejudice in these situations, where a typical
defendant would be even less likely to plead
guilty in light of the information they received
than would a defendant who had been
properly advised. Furthermore, we note that
the information provided by the trial court
during the plea colloquy was in line with rule
11, which requires the court to advise, as
concerns appeal rights, only "that the right of
appeal is limited" before accepting a guilty
plea. Utah R.Crim. P. l i t e m
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B. Right to Counsel
1f 31 Manning's final argument for resentencing is that
she was "deprived of her right to counsel during the
period for perfecting the appeal." She admits that she
"did not inform counsel that she wished to appeal," but
claims that her "trial counsel performed deficiently in
failing to advise [her] following sentencing regarding
the nature of her right to appeal and the time limit for
perfecting an appeal." TFN111 To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "a defendant
must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Bundvv. Deland 763 P.2d 803. 805 (Utah 1988). See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S.Ct.
2052. 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 f 1984V

FN11. She does not claim that she ever asked
counsel for a fuller explanation of exactly
what her "limited" appeal rights entailed,
notwithstanding having ample opportunity to
do so.

ri41 \ 32 In the context of Manning's claim,
"Strickland's holding that 'the performance inquiry
must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances'" is applicable. Roe
v. Flores-Orteea. 528 U.S. 470, 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029,
1035,145 L.Ed.2d985 (2000) (quoting Strickland 466
U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). The primary question
in this case is whether counsel's failure to advise
Manning about the specific details of her limited right
to appeal constitutes deficient performance. The
Supreme Court has held
that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to
consult with the defendant about an appeal when
there is reason to think either (1) that a rational
defendant would want to appeal (for example,
because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal),
or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in
appealing.
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Id at 480, 120 S.Ct. at 1036 (emphasis added). The
Court explained that such a judgment is based on "all
the information counsel knew or should have known"
and that "a highly relevant factor ... [is] whether the
conviction follows a trial or a guilty plea, both because
a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable
issues and because such a plea may indicate that the
defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings." Id. A
further consideration is "whetherthe defendant received
the sentence bargained for as part of the plea." Id,
K 3 3 In this case, Manning entered into a favorable plea
agreement and obtained a sentence that should have
been expected. She pled guilty to the charges of
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, failure to
render a proper tax return, and theft. In exchange, the
State dismissed three second degree felony charges and
reduced the second degree felony charge of theft by
deception to the third degree felony charge of theft.
Under the plea agreement, the State also agreed not to
file any additional charges arising out of her criminal
conduct and not to file any charges against Manning's
daughter for her involvement.
t 34 Her attorney stated at the plea hearing that
Manning had "participated in the preparation o f the
written plea statement. Manning stated that her attorney
had "taken the time to extend himself to adequately and
*209 properly serve me, and I'm satisfied with his
service." It is undisputed that she did not request that
an appeal be filed. Furthermore, Manning met with her
attorney three or four times after sentencing, at least
some of which meetings were during the time allowed
for filing an appeal, and thus had ample opportunity to
air any dissatisfaction with her sentence, concern about
her guilty plea, or interest in appealing. We cannot
believe that a rational defendant in Manning's position
would have wanted to appeal, and Manning failed to
demonstrate to her attorney any interest in appealing.
rFN12] Although Manning ultimately filed an untimely
pro se notice of appeal, this late onset of "buyer's
remorse" has no bearing on whether "counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Strickland 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct.
at 2064. In sum, Manning has failed to demonstrate any
objectively deficient performance on the part of her
counsel.
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FN12. Given Manning's favorable plea
bargain and sentence, the available grounds
for appeal appear to be very limited. She
could appeal her sentence if she believed it
was unlawful and she could challenge the
voluntariness of her guilty plea if the trial
court denied a motion for leave to withdraw
the plea.
The ordered one-year of
incarceration, with credit for time served, was
well within the range of the trial court's
discretion. The two third degree felonies each
carried a possible sentence of zero to five
years and the second degree felony carried a
possible sentence of one to fifteen years.
Manning never filed a motion to withdraw her
guilty plea, even though she was informed at
the plea hearing that she had 30 days to do so,
and she never suggested that the plea was
involuntary. Her claim is essentially that she
wants to appeal because she was not fully
informed of the nature of the right to appeal.
This type of circular reasoning, more fully
critiqued in notes 7 and 10, does not provide
a basis for a rational defendant to appeal or a
reason to invalidate the plea.

CONCLUSION
Tf 3 5 The trial court correctly denied Manning's petition
for postconviction relief. Its decision is therefore
affirmed.

11 36 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS,
Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
89 P.3d 196,496 Utah Adv. Rep. 26,2004 UT App 87
END OF DOCUMENT
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